Set permission limits, approval gates, testing requirements and incident procedures for AI agents before they can act in business systems.

AI agent governance is primarily a question of action: what can the system do, on whose authority and within which limits? A system that drafts a supplier update is different from one that sends it, changes a record or initiates a payment. Those capabilities should have separate controls.

Write an action inventory

List every connected system and every operation the agent can perform. Include reads, writes, messages, deletions and access to external content. For each action, record the business purpose, identity used and maximum permitted scope. A general description such as “connected to finance” is insufficient.

OWASP recommends limiting agent functionality, permissions and autonomy. Controls should be enforced through the connected systems, rather than relying entirely on instructions telling the model to behave.

Example controls for a supplier-update agent
Action Starting permission Control
Read approved procedure material Limited read access Restricted collection and authenticated identity
Prepare an email Draft only Reviewer sees facts and intended recipient
Send an email Approval required Validate the specific message before sending
Change banking information Excluded No available write permission for that field

Treat external material as information, not authority

A document or message the agent reads may contain instructions designed to redirect it. The workflow should not allow that content to grant new permissions or change the approved purpose. Test with deliberately misleading material before release.

For example, a supplier attachment might tell the system to ignore its normal process and send information elsewhere. The test should establish whether the agent remains within the permitted task and whether downstream controls prevent an unauthorized action even if the model proposes one.

Make approvals specific enough to matter

A reviewer should see the exact action, recipient, relevant source information and proposed change. Approval of a general plan should not silently authorize different actions later. If material details change, require the workflow to return for the appropriate review.

Keep approval steps usable. An interface that hides important changes behind a long generated explanation encourages superficial review. Highlight the facts the person needs to check and provide a clear rejection or escalation route.

Define recovery before enabling writes

Some changes can be reversed; others cannot be fully undone. An email may already have been read even if a recall is attempted. Assess the consequence of each action and avoid describing rollback as a universal safeguard.

Keep logs sufficient to investigate actions while limiting unnecessary sensitive content. Name the person who can disable the affected capability, revoke access and coordinate the response. Test the pause mechanism rather than assuming it works.

Review changes as changes in authority

A new connector, broader information collection or automatic send capability can materially change the risk. Require a review of the action inventory and controls before enabling it. Nimblox can help assess agent governance and define deployment boundaries that are technically enforceable and operationally clear.